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TESTING THE RATIONALITY OF  STATE REVENUE  FORECASTS 
ABSTRACT 
In  recent  months,  the  governors  of  several  states have 
suffered  major  political embarrassments  because actual revenues 
fell, substantially  short of  the predictions in their respective 
budgets.  Such  episodes  focus  attention  on  the  question of 
whether  states  do  a  good"  job  of forecasting  revenues.  In 
modern  economics,  forecasts  are  evaluated  on  the  basis of whether 
or  not  they  are  rational"  do  the  forecasts  optimal]  y 
incorporate all  information  that  is available  at  the  tune  they 
are  made?  This  paper  dr:vel ops  a  method  for  testing  the 
rat i.onal t.y  of state  revenue  forecasts,  and  applies  it.  to  the 
aria lysi  s  of  data  from  New  Jersey,  Massachusetts,  arid  Maryland. 
(ne  of  our  main  findtri'i;  u,;  that  in  all  three  states,  the 
I orerats of  own  revenues  are  yystematically biased dowriward 
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In 1985,  the 50 states  raised  $349 billion  in revenues  from their  own 
sources,  and received  $84 billion in grants  from  the federal  government. 
(U.S.  Bureau  of the Census [1987,  p. 266].)  State  governments  are clearly 
important  players  in the U.S.  system  of public  finance,  and the efficiency 
with which  they  conduct  their  financial  affairs  has an important  impact  on 
consumer  welfare.  One important  determinant  of a state's ability to conduct 
reasonable  fiscal  policies is the quality of its revenue  forecasts.  Sensible 
deliberations  about  expenditures  cannot  be made in the absence of "good" 
forecasts.  Indeed,  in the presence of constitutional  or statutory provisions 
for balanced  budgets,  unanticipated  changes  in revenues  can wreak havoc not 
only on proposals  that are scheduled for funding,  but on plans that have 
already been  put into  effect  as well. 
In recent  months, two powerful  governors,  Michael  Oukakis of 
Massachusetts  and Mario Cuorno  of New York,  have  suffered  major political 
embarrassments  because  actual  revenues fell  substantially  short of the 
predictions  in their  respective  states.  Such episodes  focus  attention on the 
question of whether states  do a  "good"  job of forecasting  revenues.  In 
modern economics,  forecasts  are evaluated  on the basis of whether or not they 
are "rational--do the forecasts  optimally incorporate  all  information  that 
Is available  at the time they  are made?  Although  there  is a large literature 
on state  revenue forecasting  methods,  that literature  focuses mostly on state 
budgetary institutions.  Forecasts  themselves  are evaluated  only in an 
informal  fashion.1  Although  the theory  and econometric  methods of rational 
expectations  have  been used to evaluate  forecasts  made by households  and 
businesses,2  these  powerful tools  have  not been applied to state government 
1 forecasts.  This paper brings  these  methods to bear on the problem of state 
revenue forecasting,  and as an example,  applies  them to the analysis of data 
from New Jersey,  Massachusetts,  and Maryland.  The results cast light  not 
only on the question  of rationality  per Se, but on Issues such as the impact 
of political  factors on forecasts. 
Section  II presents  the conceptual  framework  for testing rational 
expectations.  The relevant institutional  issues  and data are described  in 
Section  III.  Estimation  problems  and results  are discussed in Section  IV. 
We find that in all three  states forecasts  of own revenues are systematically 
biased downward.  Section  V concludes  with  a summary  and suggestions  for 
future  research. 
II.  Basic Concepts 
State  revenue forecasters  operate in an environment  characterized  by 
great uncertainty.  Future  revenues generated  by a given  revenue structure 
depend on future  values  of variables  like employment,  population,  and nominal 
income,  none  of which is easy  to predict.  Additional  uncertainty  is created 
by the fact that the state  tax structure  itself  may be changed in the 
future.  Such changes  depend in part on the political climate in the state, 
another thing  that is hard to predict.  To make matters even more 
complicated,  state  revenues  may depend  upon difficult  to forecast actions 
taken  by the federal  government.  For example,  in 1986,  the federal 
government  announced  that after  that year,  state sales  taxes would no longer 
be deductible  on federal  tax returns.  As a consequence,  many taxpayers  moved 
up their purchases  of durables  to 1986, creating an unanticipated increase  in 
sales  tax revenues  that year. 
Operating In such an environment,  forecasters  cannot be expected to 
2 obtain precisely  correct  answers.  Rather,  the most one can ask  is that 
forecasters  do as well as possible  given  the available  information  at the 
time the forecast is made.  To formalize  this notion, let Rt be 
the actual percent  change in nominal  revenues in period  t, and 
Rf  be the forecast  of Rt 
made f periods ago.3  'tf 
is the set of 
information  available  when the forecast is made.  By definition,  the 
conditional  expectation  of the forecast  error,  vt_f,  given  this information 
set, is 
(2.1)  vtf  E[(Rt-Rf)JItf] 
Following  Brown  and Maital  [1981],  note that (2.1)  implies  the following 
regression  equation: 
'22  'R  Re  'I  )  k  t-f 






The forecast Rf 
is said to be strongly  rational if R_f 
= 
E[RtFIt_r]. 
From equation (2.2),  this  implies  that vtf(Itf) 
is zero.  Hence,  suppose 
we estimate a regression  of (Rt 
— R_f) 
on  If the variables 
included in 1t-f 
are statistically  significant,  then  we can reject the 
hypothesis  of strong  rationality.  Intuitively,  if predictions  are strongly 
rational, then Rf  should  incorporate  all relevant Information  available 
at the time the forecast is made.  Therefore,  the forecast  error  (Rt  R_f) 
should  be uncorrelated  with any of this information. 
Suppose now that only a subset  of 't—f Is utilized in making the 
prediction.  If this subset Is used efficiently,  then the forecast is said to 
be weakly  rational.  That is, even if  all  information  is not fully utilized, 
the forecaster  gets the correct answer  on average. 
3 Like strong  rationality,  weak rationality  has a simple interpretation  in 
a regression framework.  Suppose  we estimate 
(2.3)  Rt 
= o 
+ i  Rf 
+ Lit 
If Rf 
Is weakly rational,  then  = 0 and  1.  Hence,  a test of weak 
rationality  requires  only  that we estimate  (2.3)  and use appropriate 
statistical  methods to test  that joint  hypothesis. 
There  are conflicting  views  with respect to whether revenue  predictions 
are unbiased,  and if not, whether  revenues  are over  or underpredicted. Klay 
[1983,  p. 308]  argues  that the forecasts  are systematically  too low: 
[It]  is common  for revenue  forecasts  to be made 
conservatively  in a wide range of settings 
Intentional  underestimates  are a means of coping 
with uncertainty  by reducing  the likelihood  that 
program  reductions  will become  necessary  during 
the budget  year 
Indeed,  if a surplus  'unexpectedly"  surfaces  during  the budget year,  this 
might enhance the popularity  of the administration. Another possible 
motivation  for underpredicting  revenues  is to conceal  from legislators  and 
special  Interest  groups  the resources  that  are available  to them.  Giovinazzo 
[1971,  p.  103] quotes  former  New Jersey  Governor Driscoll  as saying, "What 
the Legislature  can't find,  it can't  spend." 
On the other  hand, there  are also arguments  that forecasters  have 
Incentives  to overestimate  revenues.  High revenue forecasts  might help 
support efforts to borrow  money  to pay for operating  expenses.  One revenue 
estimator interviewed  by Glovinazzo [1971,  p. 19]  Indicated  that he sometimes 
faced political  pressures  to overestimate  revenues:  ".  .  . occasionally 
friendly persuasion  and reasoned  discussion  [were] brought to bear on him 
with the aim of convincing  him to increase  some of his estimates." 
4 It is reasonable  to ask whether over—  underpredicting  revenues  year 
after year is a viable  strategy  for fooling  people.  One would expect  that 
eventually  the forecasts  would lose credibility.  This point is especially 
telling  in states  whose legislatures  have their  own revenue forecasting 
organizations.  (The legislatures  of New Jersey  and Maryland  have such 
organizations;  Massachusetts  does not.)  Indeed,  it could  also be argued  that 
like their  counterparts  in the private  sector,  public  sector  officials  have 
incentives  to forecast  rationally.  The present  and former  state  budget 
officials  with  whom we spoke  claimed that  they did their best to be on 
target.  Interestingly,  they stated  that unexpected  surpluses  are just about 
as bad as deficits  from their point  of view.  When there  is an unexpected 
surplus,  much of the extra revenue  goes  to localities.  While the localities 
are happy to receive  the new money,  they are Irked  that they have  to re-do 
their planning,  and resent  the fact  that they  were not given  correct figures 
at the outset.  Budget  officials also  emphasized  the fact that the newspapers 
point out forecast  errors  very aggressively,  whether they  are negative or 
positive.  This observation  is consistent  with press  reports that In 1988, 
Governor Cuomo  was '.  .  .  annoyed  that  his budget  aids had embarrassed  him by 
underestimating  revenue .  .  .  in  each  of the three  previous years,  [and] 
ordered them this year not to be so conservative."4 Taken  together, these 
considerations  suggest that forecasters  have incentives  to be rational in the 
technical  sense defined  above. 
In short, there  appears to be substantial  disagreement  regarding the 
likely  outcome of estimating  equation (2.3).  Resolution  of this disagreement 
requires analysis of the data. 
5 III.  Institutional  Background  and Data 
A.  The Budgetary  Process 
New Jersey.  The  last week of every  January  the Governor of New Jersey 
submits to the legislature  a budget  statement  that includes  forecasts  of 
revenues and expenditures.5 The forecast  for each item is made over two time 
horizons.  The first, which we call the short  forecast,  is for the fiscal 
year that began  the previous July 1.  The second,  which we call the J2 
forecast, is for the fiscal  year beginning  the subsequent  July 1.  Hence,  the 
short forecast  presented  in January 1988 covers the period  July 1, 1987 to 
June 30,  1q88;  the long forecast contained  in that message is for July 1, 
1988  to June 30,  1989. 
In most states,  forecasts  are made  by a budget  division within the 
executive  branch (Hyde  and Jarocki [1983,  p.  266]).  The final  responsibility 
lies with the governor,  who reviews the forecasts,  and can modify them before 
presentation.  New Jersey is typical  in these respects.  Legal  responsibility 
for revenue estimation  resides with the Governor  and the Director of Budget 
and Accounting.  However, the forecasts  are developed in consultation  with a 
number  of offices in the executive  branch,  particularly  the various tax 
bureaus. 
The forecasting  process begins in the October precedIng  the budget 
address, and a set of figures is produced  by November.  However, these 
figures are usually  revised once or twice before  the budget  message goes to 
press in January. 
Revenue forecasting  methods differ  widely  across  the states.  Some 
states  rely on econometric  models, others on much more Informal  methods.  In 
the early 197Os  Glovinazzo  [1971,  p. 27] noted  that in New Jersey 
"formalized,  systematic  techniques  are seldom,  if ever,  used."  Rather than 
6 using econometric  models,  forecasters  used  a 'judgmental  approach--they 
informally  analyzed  past trends in different  revenue sources,  and relied 
heavily on the expertise  of members  of the various tax bureaus.  Our 
conversations  with current  and recent  budget  officials indicated  that this is 
still  pretty  much the case.  These  officials  indicated  that attempts  at 
econometric  modelling generally  led to disappointing  results, and that It  was 
better  to rely on the advice  of  'old hands"  who had a good sense of what  was 
really  going on in the state.  Revenue  forecasts  are made entirely  In—house; 
there is no contracting  to outside  consultants. 
Massachusetts.  The Massachusetts  institutions  are very similar  to those 
of New Jersey.  Revenue  estimates  are prepared each November,  and forwarded 
to the Governor,  who presents  them during  the  last week of the following 
January.  These estimates  are prepared  by the Bureau of Administration  and 
Finance  (B,A&F).  Formal  econometric  modelling  plays a somewhat  greater  role 
than it does in New Jersey.  Specifically,  BA&F receives econometric 
forecasts for Massachusetts  generated  by a consulting  firm (Data Resources, 
Inc.), and then plugs these  forecasts  into a micro simulation  model  based on 
Massachusetts  tax returns.  However,  all forecasts  are subject  to the 
judgment of "old hands,"  and some  revenue sources are forecast  without any 
formal  modelling at all.  Corporate income  taxes  were offered  as an example 
where familiarity  with individual  cases was sufficiently  important  that 
"judgment  forecasts"  were used to the exclusion  of statistical  forecasts. 
Maryland.  Estimates  of state  revenues  in Maryland are developed  through 
a process that Is similar  to the processes  of New Jersey and Massachusetts. 
Revenue forecasting  is carried  out by the Bureau of Revenue  Estimates  (BRE) 
under  the supervision  of the State  Comptroller,  Treasurer,  and Secretary  of 
Budget  and Fiscal  Planning.  The Governor receives  the estimates  in 
7 mid—December  and  incorporates  them into his budget  message which is  presented 
to the state legislature  in  mid-January. 
The use of econometric  forecasting  techniques  appears to be more 
prevalent in Maryland  than in either  New Jersey  or Massachusetts. Regression 
models have  been utilized In forecasting  state revenues in Maryland  since the 
early  1970s.  The models  tend to be quite  simple——generally  there  are fewer 
than three  explanatory  variables  for each revenue  source,  and estimation  is 
by ordinary least squares.  While  revenue forecasting  models are developed 
entirely in—house,  BRE officials  depend  significantly  on outside  econometric 
forecasting  services  for the information  on which the models  are based.  Such 
services  provide  forecasts  of various  explanatory  variables  such as state 
personal income.  As of 1987,  econometric  methods were applied to revenue 
sources that  comprised  87.5% of Maryland  tax revenues. 
Of course,  the unvarnished  regression  output is not  included  in the 
governor's  message-—quite  a few  modifications  are made.  Nevertheless,  it 
will be of some interest  to see whether  the heavier reliance  on econonietrics 
leads  to more accurate  forecasts. 
B.  Data 
New Jersey.  The budgetary  data are from the budget  messages of February 
1948 through  January  1987.  Although  budget  documents  were available  back to 
the 1930s, there appears to have been a change in accounting  conventions 
after  World War II that  made it difficult  to construct  a coherent  time series. 
For each  revenue source,  the budget  contains  the actual  value  for the 
fiscal  year that ended the previous  June 30, as well as the short and long 
forecasts  for each revenue  source.  The actual  percent changes  correspond 
to the Rt'S  of the previous  section,  and the forecasts are the R's. 
State revenues  are disaggregated  very finely.  In 1985 there  were over 
8 170 revenue sources,  which included items such as hunters  license  fees and 
shell  fisheries  leases.  For many of these  individual  items, the time series 
are not very long—-particular  taxes  and license  fees come  and go.6  For this 
reason  and for purposes  of simplicity,  we aggregated  all revenues into two 
categories,  revenues fro, own sources  and revenues in the form of grants  from 
the federal  government.  The distinction  between own source  revenues and 
grants has played  an important  role In both theoretical  and econometric 
analysis  of state  and local  government  fiscal decisions (see  Inman  [1979)); 
it seems  worthwhile  to investigate  whether the expectational  mechanisms  for 
the two revenue  sources  differ.  As in most states,  federal grants  have 
played a very important  role in the New Jersey  budget.  In 1986,  grants  were 
25 percent of own source  revenues;  the ratio  has been as high as 40 percent. 
In addition  to budgetary  data,  execution  of the strong  tests  requires 
the variables in the information  set.  As usual  in studies  of this kind,  it 
is not quite clear  how to answer  the question,  "What  did they know and when 
did they know it?'  For the "what"  part  of the question,  we assume  that 
information  on the percent  changes In the following  economic  and demographic 
variables is relevant for predicting  future  revenues:  nominal personal 
income  (INC),  population  (POP), consumer  price index  (CPI), non-agricultural 
employment (EMP), and the  lagged value of revenue itself  (Rt_f_1).  Except 
for lagged  revenue,  each variable Is available  on a calendar  year basis.7 
This leads  to a complication  in answering  the "when" part of the question. 
Given that the forecasts are made before  the calendar  year is entirely  over, 
it is not clear  whether variables  dated that year should  be included  in the 
information  set.  On one hand,  it could be argued  that even though  the 
official estimates  for the year are not out by December,  officials can 
monitor things  closely enough  to have a pretty  good idea of what the values 
9 are.  However, one could  just as well argue that the actual values  for these 
variables  may be quite different  from the officials'  perceptions.  Our 
conversations  with budget  officials indicated  that except  for income,  it is 
reasonable  to treat  the variables  as "known"  by the time the forecasts  are 
made.  On the other  hand,  income  data are available  only with a  lag; hence, 
only the lagged percentage  change In income  is assumed  to be In the 
information  set. 
As noted in Section  II, revenue forecasts  must take into account possible 
changes in tax structure  that  will be enacted by the legislature  and signed 
by the governor.  Hence,  revenue  forecasters  must make political  as well as 
economic forecasts.  Variables  that  might help predict  the political  climate 
should  therefore  be Included  in the  information  set.  For these  purposes,  we 
define  the following  dichotomous  variables: 
GOVAGR  = 1  if the party  of the governor is the same as the majority 
in the legislature,  and zero otherwise.  (If the two houses  are 
split, GOVAGR  = 0.5.) 
REPIJB  1  if the governor is a Republican,  and zero otherwise 
ELECTYR  1  if the message  is presented in an election  year,  and 
zero otherwise 
FIRSTYR  =  1  if the message  Is presented in the first  year of a 
governor's  administration,  and zero  otherwise. 
Some summary  statistics  regarding  forecast  accuracy  for New Jersey  are 
presented in Table la. The first  row shows the average percent  change in each 
revenue source  during  the sample  period.  Own revenues  grew at an annual rate 
of about 10 percent  during  our period, and grants  from the federal  government 
at about 14 percent.  The relatively  large  standard  deviations  suggest that 
this growth  was not smooth,  however.  The next three  rows show several  ways 
of summarizing  the forecast  errors  for the various  revenue sources.  Row 2 
has the mean forecast  error.  These figures suggest that  there  was a 
10 conservative  bias in the forecasts.  For example,  on average, the actual  year 
to year percent increase  in own revenues  exceeded  the forecast increase  by 
2.92 percentage  points;  for grants  the forecast  averaged 2.19 percentage 
points  below actual  growth.  Of course,  these  figures are only suggestive; 
correct  testing  for thc presence  of bias requires  the methods outlined In the 
previous  section.  The third  row of  Table  la shows the mean of the absolute 
value  of the difference  between  the actual percentage  change  and the 
predicted  percentage  change,  and row 4 shows  the root mean squared  error. 
The general  impression  conveyed  by the table is that own revenues are 
predicted  better than grants. 
Another interesting  question about the forecasts Is whether they  have 
been improving  over time.  To investigate  this  issue,  we estimated  a series  of 





.  An  estimate  of  0 
would  suggest  that  the  absolute  value  of  the forecast  error has been falling, 
mutatis  mutandis.  The results,  reported  In the bottom of Table la, 
suggest that  the absolute  value of the error in the short  own revenue 
forecasts  has been falling  by about  0.12  percentage  points  a year,  and for 
long  own revenue  forecasts,  by about  0.18 percentage  points.  These 
coefficients  are marginally  significantly  different  from zero at conventional 
levels.  The values  of yj for grants  are also negative,  but they are 
imprecisely  estimated.  One cannot  reject  the hypothesis  of no improvement  in 
the forecasts  of federal grants. 
Massachusetts.  Budgetary  data for Massachusetts  are taken from the 
annual  budget  messages  of January 1950 through  January 1987.  Like its New 
Jersey  counterpart,  the Massachusetts  budget  document includes actual revenue 
for the recently  completed  fiscal  year as well  as forecasts  for the current 
and next fiscal  year.  As is also the case for New Jersey,  there are many 
11 different sources  of revenue,  and we aggregated  them into 'own source"  and 
"grants"  categories.  However,  changes  in accounting  procedures  over time 
made it very difficult  to construct  a coherent  time series for the sum of all 
own source  revenues.  Therefore,  we focus instead  on total  tax revenues, 
which appear to have been consistently  defined over the decades,  and which 
accounted  for over  90 percent of own source  revenue in 1986. 
Moreover, it was only in 1958  that the Massachusetts  document  began 
including  federal  grants.  Hence,  our regressions  for grants are estimated 
using  a shorter  sample  period  than those  for own revenues.  For purposes  of 
doing the strong  tests of rationality,  the same variables  are assumed to be 
in the information  set as for New Jersey.8 
Summary statistics  relating  to the accuracy of the Massachusetts 
forecasts  are presented in Table lb.  Comparing the sumary statistics  in 
Tables la and lb. we can see that  own revenues  have increased  slightly  faster 
in New Jersey  than tax revenues In Massachusetts  (.103  against .097 per year) 
and have been forecast  with about the same  accuracy.  New Jersey is a bit 
better  at the short  forecast  and Massachusetts  at the long forecast.  Like 
New Jersey, the estimates  of yj suggest  that  there has been no dramatic  trend 
in the quality  of the revenue forecasts,  as measured by the absolute  value of 
the forecast error.  Federal  grants  have  grown more slowly  and been forecast 
more accurately in Massachusetts  than New Jersey.  (Recall,  however,  that the 
Massachusetts  time series  on grants  does  not include the early 1950s.)  The 
root mean squared  error  of the long grants  forecast is 0.093 in Massachusetts 
as compared  to 0.203 in New Jersey. 
Maryland.  Forecasted  and actual  values  of state revenues in Maryland are 
taken  from the annual  budget  messages  of the governor  and reports of the 
state comptroller  for fiscal  years 1946  through 1987.  While short estimates 
12 of grants are available  back to 1954,  a coherent  time series  of long 
estimates  of grants  can only be constructed  for fiscal  years 1972 through 
1987.  As 'own source"  revenues,  we aggregated  all  revenue  sources  which are 
categorized  in Maryland  as "General  Fund"  revenues.  This category  makes up 
about 75% of non-grant evenues, and includes  all  non-dedicated  state funds 
such as receipts  from the individual  income  tax, corporate income tax, and 
the retail  sales and use tax.  Time series  for both short  and long forecasts 
of own source  revenues  are available starting  in fiscal  year 1946.  The 
variables  relating to the political  environment  are from  Boyd C 1987]. 
The Maryland summary  statistics  are presented  in Table ic.  All sources 
of revenue grew at faster  rates  In Maryland  than their counterparts  in New 
Jersey and Massachusetts.  (Recall,  however,  that the time periods over which 
the averages  are taken  differ somewhat  across  the states  as do the 
definitions  of "own revenues.")  With respect  to forecasts  of own  source 
revenues, the qualitative  picture is much the same as that for New Jersey  and 
Massachusetts——on  average,  revenues  are underforecast,  and there  has been 
some tendency  for the absolute value  of the forecast  errors  to fall over 
time. 
As is also the case in New Jersey  and Massachusetts,  grants  play an 
important  role to state public  finance.  In 1987,  the ratio of grant  to 
non—grant  revenues was about 24 percent;  it has been as high as 31 percent. 
However, Table ic indicates  that  unlike  New Jersey and Massachusetts,  in 
Maryland predictions  of grants  are too optimistic  on average.  Moreover, 
using any method for measuring the errors,  the grants  forecasts are much 
worse than In New Jersey and Massachusetts. Closer investigation  of the data 
indicated  that these results are dominated  by several  years in the mid—1970s, 
when the forecast  rate of growth  of grants  exceeded  the actual  by as much as 
13 86 percentage  points.  According  to the budget  officials  we consulted,  those 
errors  were largely  due to unanticipated  Increases  in the prices  of petroleum 
products. 
IV.  Econometric  Issues  and Results 
A.  Econometric  Issues 




and testing  the joint  hypothesis c= 
and  = 1.  Suppose that  ordinary least  squares estimation  of this 
equation leads  to errors that are serially  correlated.  This suggests that 
stroq rationality  will be rejected,  because information  that was  available 
when the prediction  was made (the previous  forecast  error)  was not being 
taken  Into account.  Nevertheless,  weak rationality  can still  obtain. 
However, in the presence  of autocorrelated  errors,  inferences  based on the 
least squares errors  may be incorrect.  Moreover,  standard "fix-ups"  such as 
quasi—differencing  will  not work in this situation  because there Is no 
guarantee  that the error term in period  t will be orthogonal  to the lagged 
value of the right hand side  variable.  Newey and West [1987)  have proposed  a 
procedure for correcting  the standard  errors  without quasi-differencing,  and 
it Is used  whenever autocorrelation  is diagnosed in the ordinary least 
squares results.9 
B.  Results:  Weak Tests of Rationality 
New Jersey.  The tests  of weak rationality  are presented in panel  (a) of 
Table  2.  Consider  column (1) which shows the results for the short forecasts 
of own revenues.  The ordinary least  squares estimate  of o  is 0.0386; the 
standard  error Is 0.00833.  One can reject the hypothesis  that a  is zero. 
The estimate  of u  is  0.873,  wIth a standard  error of 0.0625.  At 
14 conventional significance  levels,  the hypothesis  that  = 1  Is also 
rejected.  Of  course,  whether  the data are consistent  with weak rationality 
depends on the outcome  of the  hypothesis  that  ij = 0  and cq  1.  The 
p—value for the appropriate  chi-square  test is  0.00.  Thus,  the data reject 
by a wide margin  that tne short  forecasts  of own revenue are weakly  rational. 
It was already  clear  from Table la that New Jersey's short  own revenue 
forecasts tend to be biased  downward.  The estimates  of e.j and c* in Table  2 
indicate  that there is no simple  way to characterize  the nature  of the bias. 
That is, forecasters  do not always  underforecast  by the same number  of 
percentage  points  (because  u  is not zero); neither do they underforecast  by 
a constant proportion  of the correct forecast  (because  aj is not zero). 
Hence, there  does not appear  to be a simple  rule of thumb  producing  the 
discrepancy  between actual  and predicted  forecasts  of own revenues. 
Column (2) shows  the results for the short forecasts  of grants.  An 
examination  of the coefficients  one at a time seems  promising  for the null 
hypothesis  of weak rationality--0  is only 1.3 times its standard  error,  and 
is within  one standard  error of unity.  This impression  is confirmed  by 
the joint test,  which  has a p-value  of 0.408.  Thus,  unlike  own revenues,  the 
short forecasts  for grants are weakly  rational.  Although the grants 
forecasts  are  'worse" in the sense of having  a lower  R2, they are unbiased. 
The results for the long forecasts  of own revenues  are shown In column 
(3).  Like the short  forecasts  of own revenues,  the data clearly reject  the 
hypothesis  of weak rationality.  The situation  for the long  forecasts  of 
grants in column (4) is somewhat  more  murky.  The p—value  for the joint 
hypothesis  is 0.0156,  so one would reject  the null  hypothesis  at a 5 percent 
level,  but accept it at a 1 percent level. 
Just as was true with the short  forecasts,  the R2 of the long forecasts 
15 of grants is less  than  the R2 for own revenues.  Both long forecasts  have 
lower  R2's than either  of the short forecasts.  Not surprisingly,  the farther 
into the future  one predicts,  the more noise there is in the forecast. 
Massachusetts.  The weak tests  of rationality  for Massachusetts  are 
presented in panel  (b) of Table 2.  In several  important  respects,  the 
results are similar  to those  for New Jersey.  Weak rationality  cannot  be 
rejected for the short  forecasts  of  grants;  it is rejected  decisively  for 
long  forecasts  of revenues.  Moreover,  the R2's for the long forecasts in 
each category  are smaller  than those  of the associated  short  forecasts.  But 
there  are several  differences  as well.  For short forecasts  of own revenues, 
weak rationality  is not decisively  rejected;  the p—value is 0.0291, 
indicating  that at a one percent significance  level  one would accept  the 
hypothesis.  On the other hand,  for long forecasts  of grants,  the 
Massachusetts  data are clearly consistent  with weak rationality,  while for 
New Jersey, the outcome was more ambiguous. 
Maryland.  The weak tests of rationality  are in  panel  (c) of Table  2.  As 
was the case for Massachusetts,  weak rationality  for the short  forecasts  of 
own revenues Is not decisively  rejected;  the p-value  is 0.0101, indicating 
that at a one percent  significance  level  one would (barely)  accept  the 
hypothesis.  For the long forecasts  of own revenues,  the results are 
identical  to those of both New Jersey  and Massachusetts--weak  rationality  is 
rejected.  It appears,  then,  that the greater  reliance on econometric 
forecasting  methods in Maryland does not make much of a difference.  One 
could argue that this Inference  is unfair,  given that Maryland  only began 
using econometrics  for forecasting  own revenues  after 1973.  We therefore 
estimated  the equations  separately  for the before  and after  1973 periods. 
Using standard  F-tests,  one cannot  reject the joint hypothesis  that u  and j 
16 were the sane during  the two periods.  Specifically,  for the short forecasts, 
the significance  level  of the test  was 0.790;  for the  long forecasts, it was 
0.248. 
We do not regard  these  results as "proof"  that econometric  forecasting 
methods are useless--it  could be that  Maryland implements  these  methods 
poorly,  and/or  that the results are ignored  by political decision-makers, 
and/or  that for some  reason  revenues have become Intrinsically  more difficult 
to forecast  since 1973,  so that in the absence  of econometric  methods, the 
results  would have  been worse.  Still,  on the basis of these results,  one 
would have to be cautious  about urging  states  to fire their  "old hands"  and 
replace them  with computers. 
Turning now to the grants  forecasts,  we see that unlike  New Jersey and 
Massachusetts,  weak rationality  is rejected.  This finding  is not altogether 
surprising given  the discussion  surrounding  Table ic.  The series  of gigantic 
over—predictions  of grants  in the mid—1970s  makes it Impossible  that the 
forecasts  as a whole would exhibit  weak rationality. 
C.  Results:  Strong  Tests  of Rationality 
New Jersey.  In light of the fact that the New Jersey  data already 
rejected  weak rationality  for own revenues,  we expect  that strong  rationality 
will also be  rejected.  Nevertheless,  it  is still  of some interest  to examine 
the coefficients  on the various variables  in the information  set.  This 
should indicate  which information  is not being  properly  assimilated into the 
forecasts.  In contrast,  on the basis  of the weak tests, the grants  equations 
are still  in the game.  For them,  a test  of the joint hypothesis  that all the 
coefficients  are zero is of considerable  interest. 
Table 3a shows  the results  for the strong  tests.  As noted  above, the 
17 information  set  includes  economic variables  from the calendar  year preceding 
the budget  message, except  for income, which is lagged  by a year.  In 
interpreting  the coefficients,  note that  a negative  coefficient  means  that an 
increase in the associated  variable  makes the forecast  more optimistic, 
ceteris paribus.  Consider,  for example,  the column (1) results for the short 
forecasts of own revenues.  On the basis  of t—tests conducted  at conventional 
significance  levels,  the variables  that stand  out as significant  are Rt_f_1, 
REPUB, FIRSTYR, and ELECTYR.  Except  for REPUB,  they all have negative 
coefficients.  Thus,  larger percent  increases  in lagged  own revenues are 
associated  with more optimistic  revenue  forecasts.  Forecasts  made during 
election years tend to be more optimistic  than average,  as are those  made 
during the first  year of an administration. Republican  administrations  tend 
to be pessimistic  about  revenue  growth.  The qualitative  story with respect 
to these coefficients  Is about the same for the long own revenue forecasts  in 
column (3).  Here,  however,  none of them is statistically  significant. 
We turn now to the grants  forecasts.  Given that both the short and long 
forecasts  passed  the test for weak rationality  (at a 1 percent significance 
level),  the key question is whether they pass the strong  tests as well.  For 
the short forecasts  (column  (2)),  the p-value for a joint  test of the 
hypothesis  that  all  the coefficients  are zero Is 0.0620;  for the long 
forecasts (column  (4)), the p-value is 0.0821.  Thus,  in neither case can we 
reject the hypothesis  that  all the regression  coefficients  are zero.  All the 
Information  Is assimilated  into New Jersey's  grants  forecasts, i.e.,  they are 
strongly rational. 
Massachusetts.  The strong  tests  of rationality  for Massachusetts  are 
reported In Table 3b.  Consider first  the short  forecasts  of own revenues. 
Except  for the POP and CPI variables,  the signs and magnitudes are quite 
18 similar to those  for New Jersey.  Thus, for example,  increases  in past 
revenues lead to more optimistic  forecasts,  as do being in the first  year of 
an administration  and being in an election  year.  Like their New Jersey 
counterparts,  the Republican  governors of Massachusetts  tend to be more 
pessimistic  about  revenues  than the Democrats (compare  the coefficient  on 
REPUB of 0.0183  to 0.0205  from column (1) of Table 3a).  Of course, one 
should not make too much of these  similarities,  given that on a one-by—one 
basis, the coefficients  In column  (1) are Insignificantly  different  from 
zero.  Similarly,  the column (3) results  for the long  forecasts  of own 
revenues do not contain  any significant  variables. 
With respect to the results for grants In columns  (2) and (4), the key 
result is that one cannot  reject the hypothesis  that all the coefficients  are 
zero;  the p-value  for the short  forecasts is 0.427 and for the long 
forecasts,  0.229.  It appears,  then, that even  more decisively  than In the 
case of New Jersey,  forecasters  incorporate  all of the relevant Information 
into  their forecasts  of grants. 
Maryland.  The strong  tests  of rationality  for Maryland are reported in 
Table 3c.  As was the case for New Jersey and Massachusetts,  strong 
rationality is rejected  for forecasts  of own source  revenues.  However,  on a 
coefficient  by coefficient  basis,  many of the results  are different.  In 
particular,  the signs  of the "political"  variables  are reversed.  While one 
should  not make too much of this result due to the fact that the  Individual 
coefficients  are Imprecisely  estimated, It is perhaps  worth noting that 
unlike  New Jersey  and Massachusetts,  during  our sample  period  Maryland  was 
pretty  much a one-party  state.  The Democrats  controlled  the governorship  for 
all  but two years.  (The one Republican  was Spiro  T. Agnew.)  This political 
environment  differs considerably  from that in New Jersey  and Maryland;  we 
19 conjecture  that this  difference  might  affect  political  Incentives  to over-  or 
underestimate  revenues. 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3c indicate  that forecasts  of grants in 
Maryland are not strongly  rational.  Given the results  In Tables ic and panel 
(c) of Table 2, it is no surprise  to find that forecasts  of grants in 
Maryland do not incorporate  all  of the relevant information. 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper  has suggested  a framework  for examining  whether state revenue 
forecasts  are formed  rationally,  and used this framework  to analyze  budget 
data from New Jersey,  Massachusetts,  and Maryland.  The states are remarkably 
similar in several  ways:  a) on average  the forecasts  of the growth of own 
revenues have fallen  short  of actual growth;  b) there  has been some tendency 
for the forecasts  of own revenues  to improve  over  time,  but the improvement 
is generally not statistically  significant;  and  c) forecasts  of own revenues 
fail  to incorporate  all  the  information  available  to the forecasters. 
On the other  hand,  we have also found  some differences  among  the three 
states.  The most important  of these  concern the forecasts  for federal  grant 
receipts.  In New Jersey  and Massachusetts,  forecasts  of grants  are weakly 
and strongly  rational;  In Maryland they  are neither.  The results for New 
Jersey and Massachusetts  seem more intuitive.  Federal  grants  depend 
partially on expenditures  from state  funds.  Their underestimation  will 
neither restrain legislative  spending  in a way that  might be desired  by the 
executive,  nor provide  the executive  with "unexpected"  surpluses  out of which 
to fund favored programs.1° As we noted  earlier, the time series  on grants 
forecasts for Maryland is dominated  by several large  outliers in the 
mid-1970s.  Of  course,  it is illegitimate  to discard  outliers  from a time 
20 series, and we have not done so.  Still, our guess is that if the grants 
forecasts of other states  are analyzed,  they  will tend to be more like those 
of New Jersey  and Massachusetts  than  those of Maryland.11 
We also found that Maryland's  more extensive  use of econometric  methods 
does not seem  to have produced  results  much different  than those of New 
Jersey  and Massachusetts.  However,  data on more states  are required  to test 
carefully  whether differences  in state  budgetary  methods and institutions 
affect  the quality of revenue  forecasts. 
21 Table la* 
Summary  Statistics:  New Jersey 
Short Horizon  Long Horizon 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
1)  Rt  0.103  0.141  0.227  0.287 
(0.0934)  (0.237)  (0.141)  (0.317) 
2)  (Rb_Re  f) 
0.0292  0.0219  0.0697  0.0836 
t 
(0.0342)  (0.109)  (0.0805)  (0.188) 
3)  Rt-R i  0.0316  0.0863  0.0776  0.147  - 
(0.0318)  (0.0696)  (0.0728)  (0.142) 
4)  R.M.S.E.  0.0445  0.110  0.106  0.203 
Trend in  Rt_RfI: 
0.0647**  0.0932  0.126  0.211 
(0.0208)  (0.0303)  (0.0311)  (0.0620) 
11  _O.00121**  -0.000248  -0.00176  -0.00230 
(0.000665)  (0.00100)  (0.00105)  (0.00210) 
*Notation:  Rt 
= actual  percent  change  in nominal  revenues 
R_ 
= forecast of Rt made f periods  ago 
(Rt_Rf) 
= forecast error 
= absolute value  of forecast  error 
R.M.S.E.  = root mean squared  error of forecast 
For the  'long horizon,' R  and Rf 
are calculated  over a two year 
period;  the numbers are not annualized. 
Numbers  In parentheses  are standard  deviations  (for means),  or standard 
errors (for regression  coefficients). 
**Estlmates  obtained after  quasi-differencing  to correct for autocorrelatlon. 
(According  to the Durbin-Watson  statistic,  this  was not required for the 
other  equations.) 
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Summary Statistics:  Massachusetts 
Short Horizon  Long  Horizon 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
1)  Rt  0.0975  0.0884  0.186  0.172 
(0.0772)  (0.107)  (0.100)  (0.122) 
2)  (R _Re  )  0.0216  0.0191  0.0366  0.0369  t  t-f 
(0.0485)  (0.0696)  (0.0873)  (0.0867) 
3)  iR _Re  I  0.0302  0.0494  0.0666  0.0746 
t  t-f 
(0.0435)  (0.0518)  (0.0665)  (0.0560) 
4)  R.M.S.E.  0.0525  0.0709  0.0935  0.0926 
Trend  in IRt_Rf 
I 
0.0357  0.0139  0.102  0.0979 
(0.0152)  (0.345)  (0.0222)  (0.0379) 
-0.000304  0.00154  -0.00200  -0.00101 
(0.000738)  (0.00143)  (0.00107)  (0.00157) 
*See  notes to  Table  lb. 
23 Table lc* 
Summary Statistics:  Maryland 
Short Horizon  Long Horizon 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
1)  Rt  0.132  0.153  0.281  0.330 
(0.110)  (0.133)  (0.175)  (0.210) 
2)  (R _Re 
f) 
0.0286  -0.116  0.112  —0.293 
t  t 
(0.0507)  (0.251)  (0.137)  (0.310) 
3)  iR _Re  0.0318  0.176  0.113  0.308 
t  t 
(0.0487)  (0.213)  (0.135)  (0.294) 
4)  R.M.S.E.  0.0580  0.273  0.175  0.421 
Trend  in 
IRt 
— R_fI: 
0.0735  0.0266**  0.254  1.888** 
(0.0174)  (0.135)  (0.0492)  (0.557) 
-0.00151  0.00465**  -0.00502  _0.0390** 
(0.000580)  (0.00533)  (0.00162)  (0.0128) 
*See  notes to  Table  la. 
**Estimates  obtained after quasi—differencing to  correct for autocorrelation. 
(According to  the Durbin—Watson  statistic, this was not required for the 
other equations.) 
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Weak Tests of  Ratlonallty* 
Short Forecasts  Long Forecasts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
(a)  New Jersey 
0.0386  0.0272  0.105  0.111 
(0.00833)  (0.0202)  (0.0169)  (0.0367) 
0.873  0.956  0.772  0.867 
(0.0625)  (0.0813)  (0.0764)  (0.103) 
1.40  1.73  1.81  1.88 
0.89  0.79  0.74  0.66 
0.00  0.408  0.00  0.0156 
(b)  Massachusetts 
.O3O5  -0.0106  0.0916  0.0626 
(0.0123)  (0.0225)  (0.0214)  (0.0398) 
0.883  0.921  0.633  0.810 
(0.121)  (0.162)  (0.124)  (0.136) 
2.45  2.45  1.33  1.28 
R2  0.62  0.58  0.36  0.53 
P(0=0,  cti=1)  0.0291  0.373  0.0009  0.232 
25 Table  2 (continued) 
(c)  Maryland 
0.0259  0.0890  0.129  0.0723 
(0.0116)  (0.0273)  (0.0324)  (0.0820) 
1.026  0.239  0.900  0.415 
(0.112)  (0.0690)  (0.109)  (0.109) 
D-W  1.50  2.26  1.47  1.87 
R2  0.79  0.28  0.39  0.51 
p(a0=0,  a1=1)  0.0101  0.00  0.00  0.00 
*Numbers in parentheses  are standard  errors.  In cases  where the 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  rejects  the null  hypotehsis  of no 
autocorrelation,  standard  errors  are coniputed using Newey and West's 
[1987] correction  for autocorrelation. 
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Strong  Tests of Rationality:  New Jersey* 
Short Forecasts  Long Forecasts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
Constant  0.0701  -0.0969  0.169  0.0633 
(0.0174)  (0.0696)  (0.0572)  (0.133) 
INCt_2  -0.416  1.34  0.316  -1.52 
(0.226)  (0.782)  (0.708)  (1.70) 
POPt_i  0.0113  3.79  —3.42  6.69 
(0.467)  (1.98)  (1.89)  (4.56) 
CPIt_i  0.0320  -1.44  -1.15  0.00143 
(0.116)  (0.694)  (0.656)  (1.56) 
0.199  -0.398  -0.379  0.386 
(0.163)  (0.561)  (0.512)  (1.06) 
Rt_f_1  -0.138  -0.0350  -0.208  0.181 
(0.0619)  (0.0699)  (0.188)  (0.132) 
REPUB  0.0205  -0.0532  0.0189  -0.0363 
(0.0107)  (0.0355)  (0.0304)  (0.0726) 
FIRSTYR  -0.0256  0.00281  -0.0110  0.0749 
(0.00787)  (0.0505)  (0.0407)  (0.0959) 
ELECTYR  -0.0307  0.0315  -0.0368  -0.0402 
(0.0116)  (0.0404)  (0.0361)  (0.0810) 
GOVAGR  0.00509  0.0921  -0.00291  0.0635 
(0.00732)  (0.0415)  (0.0340)  (0.0792) 
D-W  0.959  2.22  1.99  2.27 
R2  0.45  0.40  0.27  0.30 
p(all coefficients  0.00  0.0620  0.00494  0.0821 
zero) 
*Numbers In parentheses  are standard  errors.  In cases  where the Durbin- 
Watson statistic  rejects the null hypothesis  of no autocorrelation,  standard 
errors are computed using  Newey and West's (1987) correction  for 
autocorrelation. 
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Strong  Tests  of Rationality: Wassachusetts* 
Short Forecasts  Long Forecasts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
Constant  0.0736  0.115  0.0367  0.213 
(0.0268)  (0.0832)  (0.0756)  (0.114) 
INCt_2  -0.560  -1.84  -1.20  -2.06 
(0.529)  (1.26)  (1.22)  (1.75) 
POPt_i  —0.859  1.61  —0.138  —1.27 
(0.788)  (3.94)  (1.36)  (4.10) 
CPIt_i  -0.309  0.780  0.788  -0.225 
(0.331)  (0.917)  (0.860)  (1.12) 
EMPt_1  0.146  —0.191  0.830  0.0318 
(0.331)  (0.744)  (0.789)  (1.40) 
Rtfl  -0.129  —0.272  -0.150  0.0884 
(0.0981)  (0.162)  (0.270)  (0.1621) 
REPUB  0.0183  -0.0358  0.0484  0.00288 
(0.0122)  (0.039)  (0.0664)  (0.0431) 
FIRSTYR  -0.0192  -0.0203  0.0586  -0.0476 
(0.0136)  (0.0403)  (0.0321)  (0.0546) 
ELECTYR  -0.0371  0.0217  -0.00335  -0.0533 
(0.0130)  (0.0374)  (0.0269)  (0.0464) 
GOVAGR  0.0223  +  0.0331  + 
(0.0113)  (0.0454) 
D-W  2.35  2.21  2.13  2.32 
0.32  0.34  0.17  .34 
p(all coefficients  0.00  0.427  0.00  0.229 
zero) 
*Numbers In parentheses  are standard  errors.  In cases  where the Durbin— 
Watson statistic  rejects the null hypothesis  of no autocorrelatlon,  standard 
errors  are computed  using Newey  and West's (1987]  correction  for 
autocorrelatlon. 
The  time period used to estimate the grants  equations  was 1958-1987; 
during  this period  GOVAGR  was perfectly  collinear  with other  right hand side 
variables,  and therefore  had to be omitted.  This problem  did not arise In the 
longer  period (1950-1987)  used to estimate  the own revenue  equations. 
28 Table  3c 
Strong  Tests  of Rationality:  Maryland* 
Short Forecasts  Long Forecasts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Own  Own 
Revenues  Grants  Revenues  Grants 
Constant  -0.00511  -0.0199  0.0959  -0.199 
(0.00533)  (0.140)  (0.0637)  (0.428) 
INCt_2  0.0524  0.284  0.520  2.67 
(0.0722)  (0.999)  (0.534)  (3.61) 
0.825  4.15  -1.38  -8.18 
(0.219)  (3.17)  (1.71)  (7.40) 
CPIt_i  0.127  —2.73  —1.04  —1.46 
(0.0895)  (1.60)  (0.743)  (2.84) 
-0.0740  —2.060  -1.94  -2.32 
(0.125)  (0.686)  (0.771)  (2.98) 
-0.00120  —0.175  -0.0777  -0.245 
(0.0137)  (0.173)  (0.116)  (0.305) 
REPUB  -0.0116  0.102  0.0947  + 
(0.00986)  (0.0414)  (0.0419) 
FIRSTYR  0.0219  0.0596  0.154  -0.0662 
(0.00711)  (0.0516)  (0.0526)  (0.0903) 
ELECTYR  0.000818  -0.0454  0.0464  -0.112 
(0.00696)  (0.0477)  (0.0388)  (0.170) 
1.04  0.85  2.23  1.30 
0.32  0.37  0.43  0.16 
p(all coefficients  0.0  0.0  0.0002  0.0 
= zero) 
in  parentheses  are standard  errors.  In cases where the 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  rejects the null hypothesis  of no autocorrelation, 
standard errors are computed using  Newey  and West's [1987] correction  for 
autocorrelation.  Also,  the variable  GOVAGR  Is perfectly  collinear  with other 
right hand side variables  throughout  all the sample  periods considered  here, 
and is therefore  omitted. 
+The time period  used to estimate  the equations  for long  forecasts  of grant 
revenues was 1972—1987;  durIng this  period  there  were no Republican  Governors 
in Maryland, and therefore  the variable  REPUB  was omitted.  This problem  did 
not arise In the longer  periods used to estimate  the other  equations. 
29 Footnotes 
1.  See, for example,  Litterman  and Supel  (1983].  Klay [1983] and 
Hyde and Jarocki  [1983] discuss  the various  institutional 
arrangements  for making  revenue  forecasts,  summarize  the techniques 
that have  been used,  and provide  brief  histories  of state revenue 
forecasting. 
2.  For some  examples,  see Bernhelm (1987] on expected social  security 
benefits,  Zarnowitz  (1985]  on expected  business  conditions  such as 
GNP and the inflation  rate,  Leonard  [1982) on businesses'  wage 
expectations,  and Mankiw  and Shapiro  [1986] on the GNP predictions 
made by the Bureau  of Economic  Analysis.  Lovell [1986]  summarizes  a 
number  of other  studies. 
3.  The analysis  can just as well be conducted  in terms of levels  as 
percent  changes;  we follow  Zarnowltz  [1985] and others in using percent 
changes. 
4.  New York Times,  May 26, 1988,  p.  B1. 
5.  Before 1973,  the message  was presented  in mid-February. 
6.  An Important  example is the state  income tax, which has only been in 
existence  since  the 1970s. 
7.  Data sources  for New Jersey  are as follows:  Employment:  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics,  Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States,  various Issues; 
Political  Affiliations  (for both governor  and state legislators):  Counci 
of State  Governments,  Book of the States,  various  issues;  CPI:  Economic 
Report  of the President  1987,  Table  B—57;  Population  and Personal 
Income:  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  State  Personal Income:  1929—82, 
U.S. Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC 1984,  pp. 79—82, 
30 and updated with various  issues of the Statistical  Abstract  of the 
United  States. 
8.  INC,  POP,  CPI and EMP are from the same sources as New Jersey. 
REPUB,  FIRSTYR.  GOVAGR  and ELECTYR are from Dalton and Wlrkkala [1984]. 
9.  Brown and Maital [1981]  stress  that  for multi—period  ahead forecasts, 
the error terms  may be moving  averages.  The Newey-West  procedure 
produces consistent  standard  errors in the presence  of such an error 
structure. 
10. We are grateful  to a referee  for pointing out this fact to us. 
11. Another possible reason for the poor quality of Maryland's  grants 
forecasts is that they  are not  Integrated  with the rest  of the budget 
document.  That Is,  the  "bottom  line"  that indicates  whether the budget 
is in balance is not affected  by the forecast of grants. 
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